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Single Idea 17579

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

Counterpart Theory essentially reduces all problems about counterfactual identity to problems about choosing appropriate similarity relations. That is, Counterpart Theory essentially eliminates problems of counterfactual identity as such.

Gist of Idea

Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations

Source

Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14)

Book Ref

Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.167

The 43 ideas from 'Material Beings'

17531 I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
17556 Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
17559 Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
17558 Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
17557 Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
17560 If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
17561 If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
17562 The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
17564 The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
17563 The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
17565 Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
17566 I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
17570 The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
17567 A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
17568 A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
17569 Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
17571 Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
14228 If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
14227 We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
14468 Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
17573 There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]
17576 If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
17574 If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
17575 The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
17577 When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
17578 I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
17580 One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
17581 Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
17582 Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
17587 The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
17583 There are no heaps [Inwagen]
17585 Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
17589 If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
17588 We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
17586 At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
17584 Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
14230 We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
8264 Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
10662 Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]