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Single Idea 17581
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
]
Full Idea
Being caught up in the life of an organism is, like being rich or being tall, a matter of degree, and is in that sense a vague condition.
Gist of Idea
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague
Source
Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 17)
Book Ref
Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.217
A Reaction
Van Inwagen is trying to cover himself, given that he makes a sharp distinction between living organisms, which are unified objects, and everything else, which isn't. There may be a vague centre to a 'life', as well as vague boundaries.
The
43 ideas
from 'Material Beings'
17531
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I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples'
[Inwagen]
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17559
|
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required?
[Inwagen]
|
17556
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Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
[Inwagen]
|
17558
|
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters
[Inwagen]
|
17557
|
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something?
[Inwagen]
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17560
|
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object?
[Inwagen]
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17561
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If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things
[Inwagen]
|
17562
|
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump
[Inwagen]
|
17564
|
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse
[Inwagen]
|
17563
|
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together
[Inwagen]
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17565
|
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible
[Inwagen]
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17570
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The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements
[Inwagen]
|
17566
|
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship
[Inwagen]
|
17567
|
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated
[Inwagen]
|
17568
|
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism
[Inwagen]
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17569
|
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap
[Inwagen]
|
14228
|
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction
[Liggins on Inwagen]
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17571
|
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple
[Inwagen]
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14227
|
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise'
[Inwagen]
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14468
|
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them
[Inwagen]
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17572
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Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible
[Inwagen]
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17573
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There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing
[Inwagen]
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17576
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If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me
[Inwagen]
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17575
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The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings
[Inwagen]
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17574
|
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations
[Inwagen]
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17578
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I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles
[Inwagen]
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17577
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When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron?
[Inwagen]
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17579
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Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
[Inwagen]
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17580
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One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body
[Inwagen]
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17581
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Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague
[Inwagen]
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17582
|
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague
[Inwagen]
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17587
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The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false
[Inwagen]
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17583
|
There are no heaps
[Inwagen]
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17584
|
Some events are only borderline cases of lives
[Inwagen]
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17586
|
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction
[Inwagen]
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17585
|
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague?
[Inwagen]
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17589
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If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem
[Inwagen]
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17588
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We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
[Inwagen]
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17590
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A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion
[Inwagen]
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17591
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Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities
[Inwagen]
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14230
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We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things
[Inwagen, by Liggins]
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8264
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Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables
[Inwagen, by Lowe]
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10662
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Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole')
[Inwagen, by Varzi]
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