more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 17588
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
In some contexts, the principle of 'the transitivity of identity' should be called 'the transitivity of definite identity'.
Gist of Idea
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
Source
Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
Book Ref
Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.263
A Reaction
He is making room for a person to retain identity despite having changed. Applause from me.
Related Idea
Idea 17589
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
The
33 ideas
with the same theme
[how we should understand the idea of identity]:
11380
|
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
[Aristotle]
|
22143
|
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22144
|
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22146
|
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22145
|
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22147
|
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22148
|
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
19394
|
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality
[Leibniz]
|
1207
|
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity
[Hume]
|
21290
|
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different
[Hume]
|
11874
|
Real identity admits of no degrees
[Reid]
|
21320
|
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
[Reid]
|
1367
|
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
[Reid]
|
16022
|
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege
[Frege, by Noonan]
|
11100
|
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals
[Frege, by Quine]
|
4893
|
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
[Frege, by Perry]
|
6056
|
Identity is not a relation between objects
[Wittgenstein]
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
[Quine]
|
18965
|
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
[Quine]
|
15475
|
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts
[Martin,CB]
|
15486
|
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications
[Martin,CB]
|
18389
|
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
16981
|
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
[Kripke]
|
17509
|
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
|
4885
|
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
17588
|
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
[Inwagen]
|
6058
|
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
|
11888
|
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
|
15603
|
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
[Fine,K]
|
10522
|
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations
[Hale]
|
8970
|
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
[Hawthorne]
|