more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 17588
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
In some contexts, the principle of 'the transitivity of identity' should be called 'the transitivity of definite identity'.
Gist of Idea
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
Source
Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
Book Ref
Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.263
A Reaction
He is making room for a person to retain identity despite having changed. Applause from me.
Related Idea
Idea 17589
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
The
43 ideas
from 'Material Beings'
17531
|
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples'
[Inwagen]
|
17559
|
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required?
[Inwagen]
|
17556
|
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
[Inwagen]
|
17558
|
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters
[Inwagen]
|
17557
|
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something?
[Inwagen]
|
17560
|
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object?
[Inwagen]
|
17561
|
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things
[Inwagen]
|
17562
|
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump
[Inwagen]
|
17564
|
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse
[Inwagen]
|
17563
|
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together
[Inwagen]
|
17565
|
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible
[Inwagen]
|
17570
|
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements
[Inwagen]
|
17566
|
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship
[Inwagen]
|
17567
|
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated
[Inwagen]
|
17568
|
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism
[Inwagen]
|
17569
|
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap
[Inwagen]
|
14228
|
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction
[Liggins on Inwagen]
|
17571
|
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple
[Inwagen]
|
14227
|
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise'
[Inwagen]
|
14468
|
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them
[Inwagen]
|
17572
|
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible
[Inwagen]
|
17573
|
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing
[Inwagen]
|
17576
|
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me
[Inwagen]
|
17575
|
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings
[Inwagen]
|
17574
|
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations
[Inwagen]
|
17578
|
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles
[Inwagen]
|
17577
|
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron?
[Inwagen]
|
17579
|
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
[Inwagen]
|
17580
|
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body
[Inwagen]
|
17581
|
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague
[Inwagen]
|
17582
|
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague
[Inwagen]
|
17587
|
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false
[Inwagen]
|
17583
|
There are no heaps
[Inwagen]
|
17584
|
Some events are only borderline cases of lives
[Inwagen]
|
17586
|
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction
[Inwagen]
|
17585
|
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague?
[Inwagen]
|
17589
|
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem
[Inwagen]
|
17588
|
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
[Inwagen]
|
17590
|
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion
[Inwagen]
|
17591
|
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities
[Inwagen]
|
14230
|
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things
[Inwagen, by Liggins]
|
8264
|
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables
[Inwagen, by Lowe]
|
10662
|
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole')
[Inwagen, by Varzi]
|