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Single Idea 17591

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects ]

Full Idea

Talk of merely possible objects may be redeemed in either maximally consistent sets of properties or in haecceities.

Gist of Idea

Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities

Source

Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 19)

Book Ref

Inwagen,Peter van: 'Material Beings' [Cornell 1995], p.281


The 9 ideas with the same theme [whether non-actual objects might possibly exist]:

A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza]
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]