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Single Idea 17644

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism ]

Full Idea

What makes the metaphysical realist a 'metaphysical' realist is his belief that there is somewhere 'one true theory' (two theories which are true and complete descriptions of the world would be mere notational variants of each other).

Gist of Idea

Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory

Source

Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')

Book Ref

Putnam,Hilary: 'Realism and Reason: Papers vol 3' [CUP 1985], p.211

A Reaction

This is wrong!!!!! Commitment to one reality doesn't imply that only one comprehensive theory is possible. Theory-making (at least in any human language, or in mathematics) is an inherently limited activity.

Related Ideas

Idea 17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]

Idea 12598 Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]

Idea 14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]

The 41 ideas with the same theme [commitment to the existence of a reality outside our minds]:

7953 Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
12568 God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
12741 If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz]
12740 The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz]
13184 The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
13188 The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7416 Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant]
22014 Consciousness is not entirely representational, because there are pains, and the self [Schulze, by Pinkard]
22059 Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
22083 Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
21470 For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer]
21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
19240 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
19239 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
7153 We can't be realists, because we don't know what being is [Nietzsche]
20726 We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
20727 Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
21538 If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell]
17545 Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg]
18900 Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
6280 Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
2349 Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
9869 Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
22297 Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter]
15049 Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
8184 Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
22355 In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
14896 Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
16523 Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
16524 Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
2781 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
2969 How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
7045 Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
22633 Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]