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Full Idea
Grue cannot be a relevant kind for induction in the same world as green, for that would preclude some of the decisions, right or wrong, that constitute inductive inference.
Gist of Idea
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely
Source
Nelson Goodman (Ways of Worldmaking [1978], 1.4b)
Book Ref
Goodman,Nelson: 'Ways of Worldmaking' [Hackett 1984], p.11
A Reaction
This may make 'grue' less mad than I thought it was. I always assume we are slicing the world as 'green, blue and grue'. I still say 'green' is a basic predicate of experience, but 'grue' is amenable to analysis.
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |