more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 17663
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
]
Full Idea
Paradox of Analysis:if we ask what sort of thing an X is, then either we know what an X is or we do not. If we know then there is no need to ask the question. If we do not know then there is no way to begin the investigation. It's pointless or impossible
Gist of Idea
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.2)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.5
A Reaction
[G.E. Moore is the source of this, somewhere] Plato worried that to get to know something you must already know it. Solving this requires the concept of a 'benign' circularity.
Related Ideas
Idea 2091
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
Idea 9163
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
Idea 17082
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
The
35 ideas
from 'What is a Law of Nature?'
12677
|
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical
[Armstrong, by Ellis]
|
8582
|
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
16246
|
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive
[Maudlin on Armstrong]
|
9480
|
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything
[Bird on Armstrong]
|
17662
|
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
[Armstrong]
|
17663
|
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17664
|
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17668
|
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
[Armstrong]
|
17669
|
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
[Armstrong]
|
17671
|
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17670
|
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
[Armstrong]
|
17672
|
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
[Armstrong]
|
17674
|
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
[Armstrong]
|
17675
|
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
|
17676
|
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
[Armstrong]
|
17678
|
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
[Armstrong]
|
17677
|
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
[Armstrong]
|
17680
|
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
[Armstrong]
|
17679
|
All instances of some property are strictly identical
[Armstrong]
|
17681
|
The laws of nature link properties with properties
[Armstrong]
|
17682
|
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
[Armstrong]
|
17685
|
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
[Armstrong]
|
17684
|
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
[Armstrong]
|
17683
|
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
17688
|
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
[Armstrong]
|
17689
|
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
[Armstrong]
|
17690
|
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws
[Armstrong, by PG]
|
17691
|
Nothing is genuinely related to itself
[Armstrong]
|
17692
|
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
[Armstrong]
|
17693
|
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
[Armstrong]
|
17686
|
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
[Armstrong]
|
15442
|
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|