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Single Idea 17667

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers ]

Full Idea

It is not denied that statements attributing dispositions and/or powers to objects are often true. But the truth-makers or ontological ground for such statements must always be found in the actual, or categorical, properties of the objects involved.

Gist of Idea

Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties

Source

David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 01.3)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.9

A Reaction

This is the big debate in the topic of powers. I love powers, but you always think there must be 'something' which has the power. Could reality entirely consist of powers? See Fetzer.

Related Ideas

Idea 17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]

Idea 15797 All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:

15983 Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
13602 We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
11950 We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
11941 The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
17772 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]