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Single Idea 17668

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties ]

Full Idea

For each particular it is likely that there exists at least one individuating conjunction of properties, that is, a conjunction of properties such that the particular instantiates this conjunction and nothing else does.

Gist of Idea

It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties

Source

David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 02.3)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.14

A Reaction

Armstrong commits to a famous Leibniz view, but I don't see his grounds for it. There is nothing incoherent about nature churning out perfect replicas of things, such as quarks and electrons. Would we care if two pens were perfectly identical?

The 35 ideas from 'What is a Law of Nature?'

12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8582 Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
16246 Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
9480 Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
17662 Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
17664 Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
17671 A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
17670 Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
17674 The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17676 Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
17681 The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
17682 A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
17684 To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
17688 Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
17689 Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
17690 Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
17692 We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
17693 The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]