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Single Idea 17672

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation ]

Full Idea

A good reason for P is not necessarily an explanation of P. The presence of smoke is a good reason for thinking that fire is present. But it is not an explanation of the presence of fire.

Gist of Idea

A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)

Source

David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 04.2)

Book Ref

Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.40

A Reaction

This may be an equivocation on 'the reason for'. Smoke is a reason for thinking there is a fire, but no one would propose it as a reason for the fire. If the reason for the fire was arson, that would seem to explain it as well.

The 35 ideas from 'What is a Law of Nature?'

12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8582 Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
16246 Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
9480 Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]
17662 Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
17664 Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
17671 A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
17670 Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
17674 The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17676 Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
17681 The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
17682 A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
17684 To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
17688 Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
17689 Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
17690 Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
17692 We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
17693 The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]