more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 17676
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
]
Full Idea
The best explanation explains the most by means of the least. Explanation unifies.
Gist of Idea
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 05.4)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.73
A Reaction
To get unification, you need to cite the diversity of what is explained, and not the mere quantity. The force of gravity unifies because it applies to such a diversity of things.
The
35 ideas
from 'What is a Law of Nature?'
16246
|
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive
[Maudlin on Armstrong]
|
9480
|
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything
[Bird on Armstrong]
|
8582
|
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
12677
|
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical
[Armstrong, by Ellis]
|
17662
|
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
[Armstrong]
|
17663
|
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17664
|
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17668
|
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
[Armstrong]
|
17669
|
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
[Armstrong]
|
17671
|
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17670
|
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
[Armstrong]
|
17672
|
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
[Armstrong]
|
17674
|
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
[Armstrong]
|
17675
|
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
|
17676
|
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
[Armstrong]
|
17677
|
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
[Armstrong]
|
17680
|
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
[Armstrong]
|
17679
|
All instances of some property are strictly identical
[Armstrong]
|
17678
|
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
[Armstrong]
|
17681
|
The laws of nature link properties with properties
[Armstrong]
|
17682
|
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
[Armstrong]
|
17684
|
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
[Armstrong]
|
17685
|
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
[Armstrong]
|
17683
|
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
17688
|
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
[Armstrong]
|
17689
|
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
[Armstrong]
|
17690
|
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws
[Armstrong, by PG]
|
17691
|
Nothing is genuinely related to itself
[Armstrong]
|
17692
|
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
[Armstrong]
|
17693
|
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
[Armstrong]
|
17686
|
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
[Armstrong]
|
15442
|
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|