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Single Idea 17677
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
]
Full Idea
Past, present and future I take to be all and equally real. A universal need not be instantiated now.
Gist of Idea
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.82
A Reaction
This is the price you must pay for saying that you only believe in universals which are instantiated.
The
35 ideas
from 'What is a Law of Nature?'
12677
|
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical
[Armstrong, by Ellis]
|
8582
|
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
16246
|
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive
[Maudlin on Armstrong]
|
9480
|
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything
[Bird on Armstrong]
|
17662
|
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
[Armstrong]
|
17664
|
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
[Armstrong]
|
17663
|
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17668
|
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
[Armstrong]
|
17669
|
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
[Armstrong]
|
17671
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A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17670
|
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
[Armstrong]
|
17672
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A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
[Armstrong]
|
17674
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The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
[Armstrong]
|
17675
|
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
|
17676
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Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
[Armstrong]
|
17679
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All instances of some property are strictly identical
[Armstrong]
|
17678
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Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
[Armstrong]
|
17680
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The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
[Armstrong]
|
17677
|
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
[Armstrong]
|
17681
|
The laws of nature link properties with properties
[Armstrong]
|
17682
|
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
[Armstrong]
|
17684
|
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
[Armstrong]
|
17685
|
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
[Armstrong]
|
17683
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Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
|
17687
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If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
17688
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Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
[Armstrong]
|
17689
|
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
[Armstrong]
|
17690
|
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws
[Armstrong, by PG]
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17691
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Nothing is genuinely related to itself
[Armstrong]
|
17692
|
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
[Armstrong]
|
17693
|
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
[Armstrong]
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17686
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Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
[Armstrong]
|
15442
|
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
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