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Single Idea 17678
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
]
Full Idea
Universals can be brought into the spatio-temporal world, becoming simply the repeatable features of that world.
Gist of Idea
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.2)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.82
A Reaction
I wish Armstrong wouldn't use the word 'universal', which has so much historical baggage. The world obviously has repeatable features, but does that mean that our ontology must include things called 'features'? Hm.
Related Idea
Idea 17686
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
The
133 ideas
from David M. Armstrong
8505
|
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich
[Armstrong]
|
8506
|
Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation
[Armstrong]
|
8507
|
Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs
[Armstrong]
|
3900
|
Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs
[Armstrong, by Scruton]
|
4253
|
Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
[Armstrong]
|
15542
|
All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
15547
|
Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
5690
|
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility
[Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
|
5493
|
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical
[Armstrong, by Lycan]
|
4600
|
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser
[Armstrong, by Heil]
|
6498
|
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities
[Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
|
14330
|
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis
[Armstrong]
|
11003
|
The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account
[Armstrong, by Read]
|
4032
|
The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type'
[Armstrong]
|
7429
|
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
[Armstrong]
|
7432
|
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
[Armstrong]
|
7434
|
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
[Armstrong]
|
7431
|
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
[Armstrong]
|
7436
|
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
[Armstrong]
|
7437
|
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same
[Armstrong]
|
7438
|
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
[Armstrong]
|
7440
|
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
[Armstrong]
|
5492
|
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects?
[Armstrong]
|
4036
|
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities
[Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
4034
|
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
[Armstrong]
|
8535
|
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
[Armstrong]
|
8529
|
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
[Armstrong]
|
8532
|
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
|
8530
|
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
[Armstrong]
|
8536
|
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
[Armstrong]
|
8531
|
In most sets there is no property common to all the members
[Armstrong]
|
8533
|
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
[Armstrong]
|
4035
|
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
[Armstrong]
|
8541
|
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
[Armstrong]
|
8540
|
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
[Armstrong]
|
8538
|
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
|
8539
|
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
|
8537
|
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
|
15754
|
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
|
15753
|
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
[Armstrong]
|
7024
|
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated
[Armstrong, by Heil]
|
15544
|
If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
10729
|
Universals explain resemblance and causal power
[Armstrong, by Oliver]
|
9478
|
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates
[Armstrong, by Bird]
|
10728
|
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori
[Armstrong, by Oliver]
|
4031
|
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property
[Armstrong]
|
10024
|
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction
[Armstrong, by Hodes]
|
18467
|
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
[Armstrong]
|
18468
|
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation
[Armstrong, by MacBride]
|
18368
|
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
[Armstrong]
|
18370
|
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
[Armstrong]
|
18371
|
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
[Armstrong]
|
18372
|
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
[Armstrong]
|
18373
|
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
[Armstrong]
|
18374
|
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
[Armstrong]
|
18375
|
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
[Armstrong]
|
18377
|
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
[Armstrong]
|
18378
|
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
[Armstrong]
|
18379
|
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
[Armstrong]
|
18380
|
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
[Armstrong]
|
18381
|
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
[Armstrong]
|
18382
|
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
[Armstrong]
|
18384
|
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
[Armstrong]
|
18385
|
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
[Armstrong]
|
18386
|
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
[Armstrong]
|
18387
|
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
[Armstrong]
|
18388
|
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
[Armstrong]
|
18389
|
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
18390
|
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
[Armstrong]
|
18393
|
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
[Armstrong]
|
18392
|
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
[Armstrong]
|
18391
|
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
[Armstrong]
|
18394
|
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
[Armstrong]
|
18396
|
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
[Armstrong]
|
18400
|
Properties are not powers - they just have powers
[Armstrong]
|
18397
|
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
[Armstrong]
|
18399
|
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
[Armstrong]
|
18401
|
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced
[Armstrong]
|
4437
|
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
[Armstrong]
|
4438
|
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
[Armstrong]
|
4436
|
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
[Armstrong]
|
4434
|
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
[Armstrong]
|
4435
|
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
[Armstrong]
|
4431
|
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
|
4433
|
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
[Armstrong]
|
4432
|
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
[Armstrong]
|
4439
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
|
4440
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
|
4446
|
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
[Armstrong]
|
4445
|
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
|
4444
|
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
|
4448
|
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
[Armstrong]
|
4442
|
Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem
[Armstrong]
|
12677
|
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical
[Armstrong, by Ellis]
|
16246
|
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive
[Maudlin on Armstrong]
|
9480
|
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything
[Bird on Armstrong]
|
8582
|
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
17662
|
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
[Armstrong]
|
17664
|
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
[Armstrong]
|
17663
|
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17666
|
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
[Armstrong]
|
17667
|
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
[Armstrong]
|
17668
|
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
[Armstrong]
|
17669
|
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
[Armstrong]
|
17671
|
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
[Armstrong]
|
17670
|
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
[Armstrong]
|
17672
|
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
[Armstrong]
|
17674
|
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
[Armstrong]
|
17675
|
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
[Armstrong]
|
17676
|
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
[Armstrong]
|
17680
|
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
[Armstrong]
|
17678
|
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
[Armstrong]
|
17677
|
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
[Armstrong]
|
17679
|
All instances of some property are strictly identical
[Armstrong]
|
17681
|
The laws of nature link properties with properties
[Armstrong]
|
17682
|
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
[Armstrong]
|
17684
|
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
[Armstrong]
|
17685
|
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
[Armstrong]
|
17683
|
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
[Armstrong]
|
17687
|
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
[Armstrong]
|
17688
|
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
[Armstrong]
|
17690
|
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws
[Armstrong, by PG]
|
17689
|
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
[Armstrong]
|
17691
|
Nothing is genuinely related to itself
[Armstrong]
|
17692
|
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
[Armstrong]
|
17693
|
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
[Armstrong]
|
17686
|
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
[Armstrong]
|
15442
|
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
15550
|
Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time
[Armstrong, by Lewis]
|
4798
|
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation
[Armstrong, by Psillos]
|
9497
|
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws
[Bird on Armstrong]
|
4743
|
The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth
[Armstrong]
|
4742
|
Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true
[Armstrong]
|