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Full Idea
There is an utterly natural idea that the laws of nature link properties with properties.
Gist of Idea
The laws of nature link properties with properties
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 06.3)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.85
A Reaction
Put it this way: given that properties are expressions of invariant powers, the interaction of two properties will (ceteris paribus) be invariant, and laws are just invariances in natural behaviour.
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |