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Full Idea
It may be that the necessary/contingent distinction is tied to a metaphysics which recognises possibility as a real something wider than actuality.
Gist of Idea
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
Source
David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 11.2)
Book Ref
Armstrong,D.M.: 'What is a Law of Nature?' [CUP 1985], p.163
A Reaction
Armstrong responds by trying to give an account of possibility in terms of 'combinations' from actuality. I think powers offer a much better strategy.
| 6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
| 4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
| 4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |