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Single Idea 17708

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space ]

Full Idea

One theory is that space is made up of dimensionless points, but physical processes cannot take place in regions of less than a certain size.

Gist of Idea

Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size

Source

Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 06.7)

Book Ref

Mares,Edwin: 'A Priori' [Acumen 2011], p.97


A Reaction

Thinkers in sympathy with verificationism presumably won't like this, and may prefer Feynman's view.

Related Idea

Idea 17707 We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]


The 27 ideas from Edwin D. Mares

The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]
Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]