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Single Idea 17710

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts ]

Full Idea

Aristotelian justification is the process of reasoning using concepts that are abstracted from experience (rather than, say, concepts that are innate or those that we associate with the meanings of words).

Gist of Idea

Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience

Source

Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 08.1)

Book Ref

Mares,Edwin: 'A Priori' [Acumen 2011], p.123

A Reaction

See Carrie Jenkins for a full theory along these lines (though she doesn't mention Aristotle). This is definitely my preferred view of concepts.

The 27 ideas from Edwin D. Mares

17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]