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Single Idea 17713
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
]
Full Idea
In Husserl's philosophy after 1903, he is unwilling to commit himself to any specific metaphysical views.
Gist of Idea
After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments
Source
Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 08.2)
Book Ref
Mares,Edwin: 'A Priori' [Acumen 2011], p.125
The
13 ideas
from 'A Priori'
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17700
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The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another
[Mares]
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17701
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Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements
[Mares]
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17702
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Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components
[Mares]
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17704
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Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them
[Mares]
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17703
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Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so
[Mares]
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17705
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Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights
[Mares]
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17706
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The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?
[Mares]
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17708
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Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size
[Mares]
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17710
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Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience
[Mares]
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17713
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After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments
[Mares]
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17714
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Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason
[Mares]
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17715
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The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied
[Mares]
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17716
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Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience
[Mares]
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