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Single Idea 17722

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts ]

Full Idea

The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.

Gist of Idea

The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things

Source

Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5

Book Ref

Jenkins,Carrie: 'Grounding Concepts' [OUP 2008], p.58

A Reaction

Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.

The 21 ideas from Christopher Peacocke

17722 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
11127 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke]
9335 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
18568 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
18571 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
18572 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
12577 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke]
12578 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke]
12581 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke]
12579 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke]
12584 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
12585 Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
12587 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]