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Single Idea 17737

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

Quine rejects the analytic on the grounds that it assumes a smaller unit of meaning than a total theory, and he does not think it makes sense to talk about such smaller units of meaning because there are no smaller units of empirical confirmation.

Gist of Idea

The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation

Source

report of Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 7.5

Book Ref

Jenkins,Carrie: 'Grounding Concepts' [OUP 2008], p.214

A Reaction

A very helpful account of the famous Quine argument, showing how it arises out of his particular holistic view of empiricism.

The 29 ideas from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]