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Single Idea 17772

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers ]

Full Idea

Kant argues that an object's causal powers are not intrinsic to it but feature among its relational properties.

Gist of Idea

Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic

Source

report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tim Bayne - Thought: a very short introduction Ch.7

Book Ref

Bayne,Tim: 'Thought: a very short introduction' [OUP 2013], p.107

A Reaction

[He doesn't give a reference for this] Put in this simple way, rather than obfuscated by Kant's arcane lexis, this sounds utterly false to me. Giving relations and functions explains nothing. How are those relations and functions possible?

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the idea that there are 'powers' in reality]:

15983 Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P]
13602 We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
11950 We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume]
11941 The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume]
17772 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne]
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]