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Single Idea 17862
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
]
Full Idea
Essence engenders a mere illusion of understanding
Gist of Idea
Essence gives an illusion of understanding
Source
report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence Intro
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.360
A Reaction
[Almog quotes Quine, but doesn't give a reference] This is roughly the same as Popper's criticism of essentialism.
The
29 ideas
from 'works'
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13736
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Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure
[Schaffer,J on Quine]
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3302
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Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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10211
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Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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3336
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Two things can never entail three things
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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8453
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If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
[Quine]
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10311
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No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts
[Quine, by Hale]
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10538
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Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction
[Quine, by Dummett]
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10793
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Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal
[Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
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3751
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Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true
[Quine, by Jacquette]
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8466
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For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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8467
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Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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15782
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Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia
[Quine, by Lycan]
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10667
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A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
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3325
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For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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16021
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Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology)
[Quine, by Noonan]
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8534
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Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications
[Quine, by Armstrong]
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10295
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Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
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3322
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Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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6078
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Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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15783
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Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist
[Lycan on Quine]
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2796
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For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically
[Quine, by Dancy,J]
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8450
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Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events
[Quine, by Orenstein]
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3868
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To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it
[Quine, by Newton-Smith]
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4713
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For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations
[Quine, by O'Grady]
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4712
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Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable'
[Quine, by O'Grady]
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7330
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The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants
[Quine, by Miller,A]
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17862
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Essence gives an illusion of understanding
[Quine, by Almog]
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7970
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Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist
[Quine, by Macdonald,C]
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