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Single Idea 17870

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species ]

Full Idea

Animals roaming jungles on some planet at the other end of the galaxy with the tiger-look and the tiger genetic make-up but with a disjoint evolutionary history are not the same species as the earthly tigers.

Gist of Idea

Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers

Source

Joseph Almog (Nature Without Essence [2010], 10)

Book Ref

-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.368


A Reaction

I disagree. If two independent cultures build boats, they are both boats. If we manufacture a tiger which can breed with other tigers, we've made a tiger. His 'tigers' would scream for explanation, precisely because they are tigers. If not, no puzzle.

Related Idea

Idea 17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [essence for animals is the species they belong to]:

Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter [Aristotle]
Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species [Aristotle]
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species [Aristotle, by Witt]
In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke]
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke]
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke]
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz]
Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz]
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]