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Single Idea 17871
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
]
Full Idea
Ever since Frege, semantic definitionalists have posited a meaning ('sinn') for a name; the meaning/sinn is their semantic analog to the conceptual essence, as ontologically defining of the kind.
Gist of Idea
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
Source
Joseph Almog (Nature Without Essence [2010], 07)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.370
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:
21259
|
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is
[Plato]
|
10963
|
A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
|
11292
|
Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
[Aristotle]
|
11287
|
Essence is what is stated in the definition
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
12091
|
If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
12146
|
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences
[Aristotle]
|
11200
|
The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form
[Aquinas]
|
17865
|
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula
[Descartes, by Almog]
|
12981
|
Essence is just the possibility of a thing
[Leibniz]
|
23647
|
Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define
[Reid]
|
12067
|
An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition
[Witt]
|
14260
|
An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object
[Fine,K]
|
11179
|
If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence
[Fine,K]
|
16551
|
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition
[Lowe]
|
17309
|
For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17315
|
We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
[Koslicki]
|
17866
|
Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths
[Almog]
|
17868
|
Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases
[Almog]
|
17871
|
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
[Almog]
|
17872
|
Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes
[Almog]
|
17953
|
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
[Vetter]
|