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Single Idea 17871
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
]
Full Idea
Ever since Frege, semantic definitionalists have posited a meaning ('sinn') for a name; the meaning/sinn is their semantic analog to the conceptual essence, as ontologically defining of the kind.
Gist of Idea
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
Source
Joseph Almog (Nature Without Essence [2010], 07)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.370
The
12 ideas
from 'Nature Without Essence'
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17864
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Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature
[Almog]
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17863
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Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it
[Almog]
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17866
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Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths
[Almog]
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17867
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If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds
[Almog]
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17868
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Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases
[Almog]
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17869
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Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences
[Almog]
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17871
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Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind
[Almog]
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17872
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Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes
[Almog]
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17873
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Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers
[Almog]
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17870
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Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers
[Almog]
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17876
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Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates
[Almog]
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17877
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The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms
[Almog]
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