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Single Idea 17954
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
]
Full Idea
Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ.
Gist of Idea
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
Source
Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2)
A Reaction
To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time).
The
43 ideas
from Barbara Vetter
17993
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Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain
[Vetter]
|
17953
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Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates
[Vetter]
|
17952
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Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity
[Vetter]
|
17954
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Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)?
[Vetter]
|
17955
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Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility
[Vetter]
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17956
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Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects
[Vetter]
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17957
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Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality
[Vetter]
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17958
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The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
[Vetter]
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17959
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Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
[Vetter]
|
23705
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A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities
[Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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19009
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Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it
[Vetter]
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19010
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All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects
[Vetter]
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19008
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The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification
[Vetter]
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19012
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The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality
[Vetter]
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19011
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If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible?
[Vetter]
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19013
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Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer
[Vetter]
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19015
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Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational')
[Vetter]
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19014
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How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms?
[Vetter]
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19016
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We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....'
[Vetter]
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19017
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Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised
[Vetter]
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19018
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Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
[Vetter]
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19019
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Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties
[Vetter]
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19020
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Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
[Vetter]
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19022
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Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing)
[Vetter]
|
19021
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I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability
[Vetter]
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19023
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Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies
[Vetter]
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19024
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A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class
[Vetter]
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19025
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Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions'
[Vetter]
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19026
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If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different?
[Vetter]
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19027
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Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials
[Vetter]
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19028
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Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location
[Vetter]
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19029
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It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p
[Vetter]
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19030
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Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important?
[Vetter]
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19031
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There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'.
[Vetter]
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19032
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S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds
[Vetter]
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19033
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Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates
[Vetter]
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19034
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The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts
[Vetter]
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19036
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The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible
[Vetter]
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19037
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Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce?
[Vetter]
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19039
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The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism
[Vetter]
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19038
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Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ
[Vetter]
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19040
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We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality
[Vetter]
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19041
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Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions
[Vetter]
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