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Single Idea 17957

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility ]

Full Idea

We should look at the claim that possibility is constituted by potentiality.

Gist of Idea

Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality

Source

Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4)

A Reaction

A problem that comes to mind is possibilities arising from coincidence. The whole of reality must be described, to capture all the possibilities for a particular thing. So potentialities of what? Nice thought, though.

The 43 ideas from Barbara Vetter

17993 Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter]
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
23705 A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
19009 Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter]
19010 All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter]
19008 The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter]
19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
19011 If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter]
19013 Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter]
19014 How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter]
19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
19016 We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter]
19017 Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]
19018 Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter]
19019 Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter]
19020 Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter]
19022 Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter]
19021 I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
19023 Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter]
19024 A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter]
19025 Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter]
19026 If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter]
19027 Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter]
19028 Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter]
19029 It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter]
19030 Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter]
19031 There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter]
19032 S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter]
19033 Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter]
19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
19036 The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter]
19037 Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]
19039 The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter]
19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]
19041 Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter]
19040 We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter]