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Full Idea
Some of what metaphysicians take to be metaphysically possible turns out to be only epistemically possible.
Clarification
'epistemically' means 'for all we know'
Gist of Idea
The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible
Source
Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4)
A Reaction
A nice clear expression of the increasingly common view that conceivability may be a limited way to grasp possibility.
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |