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Single Idea 17989
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
]
Full Idea
Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach.
Clarification
A 'typed' approach is hierarchical
Gist of Idea
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
Source
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.2', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2006], p.169
A Reaction
A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free.
The
47 ideas
from Thomas Hofweber
16413
|
Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics?
[Hofweber]
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16415
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Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality
[Hofweber]
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16416
|
The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc)
[Hofweber]
|
17988
|
Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
[Hofweber]
|
17989
|
Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
[Hofweber]
|
17990
|
Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
[Hofweber]
|
17991
|
Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can
[Hofweber]
|
9998
|
What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols?
[Hofweber]
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10000
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We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers
[Hofweber]
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10001
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An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase
[Hofweber]
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10002
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'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural
[Hofweber]
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10003
|
Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy?
[Hofweber]
|
10004
|
Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects
[Hofweber]
|
10005
|
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects
[Hofweber]
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10007
|
Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities
[Hofweber]
|
10006
|
First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics
[Hofweber]
|
10008
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Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential
[Hofweber]
|
21634
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Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like
[Hofweber]
|
21635
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Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires
[Hofweber]
|
21636
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'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases
[Hofweber]
|
21637
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If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities
[Hofweber]
|
21638
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Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions
[Hofweber]
|
21639
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'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer
[Hofweber]
|
21640
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'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely'
[Hofweber]
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21641
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Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world
[Hofweber]
|
21643
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The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality
[Hofweber]
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21644
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Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols
[Hofweber]
|
21645
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'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense
[Hofweber]
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21646
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The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words
[Hofweber]
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21647
|
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought
[Hofweber]
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21648
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Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities
[Hofweber]
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21649
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How can words be used for counting if they are objects?
[Hofweber]
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21652
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Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise
[Hofweber]
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21653
|
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
|
21654
|
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent
[Hofweber]
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21655
|
Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence
[Hofweber]
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21656
|
Proposition have no content, because they are content
[Hofweber]
|
21657
|
Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types'
[Hofweber]
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21658
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Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them
[Hofweber]
|
21659
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'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties
[Hofweber]
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21660
|
Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things
[Hofweber]
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21661
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There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us
[Hofweber]
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21662
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Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?
[Hofweber]
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21663
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Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes
[Hofweber]
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21664
|
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together
[Hofweber]
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21666
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'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure
[Hofweber]
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21665
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The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes
[Hofweber]
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