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Single Idea 17989

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties ]

Full Idea

Since properties themselves can have properties there is a well-known division in the theory of properties between those who take a typed and those who take a type-free approach.

Clarification

A 'typed' approach is hierarchical

Gist of Idea

Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 2.2)

Book Ref

'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.2', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2006], p.169

A Reaction

A typed approach would imply restrictions on what it can be a property of. 'Green' is a property of surfaces, 'dark' is a property of colours. My first reaction is to opt for type-free.

The 47 ideas from Thomas Hofweber

16413 Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
16415 Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
16416 The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
17990 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
17991 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]
9998 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
10000 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
10001 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
10002 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
10003 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
10004 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
10006 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
10008 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
10007 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
21634 Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
21635 Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
21636 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
21637 If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
21638 Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
21639 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
21640 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
21641 Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
21643 The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
21644 Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
21645 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
21646 The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
21647 Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
21648 Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
21649 How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
21652 Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
21653 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
21654 The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
21655 Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
21656 Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
21657 Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
21658 Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
21659 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
21660 Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
21661 There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
21662 Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
21664 Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
21663 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
21665 The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]
21666 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]