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Full Idea
A standard objection to minimalist truth is the 'incompleteness objection'. Since there are propositions inexpressible in present English the concept of truth isn't captured by all the instances of the Tarski biconditional.
Clarification
The Tarksi biconditional is "'P' is true iff P"
Gist of Idea
Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
Source
Thomas Hofweber (Inexpressible Properties and Propositions [2006], 5.3)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.2', ed/tr. Zimmerman,Dean W. [OUP 2006], p.195
A Reaction
Sounds like a good objection.
| 6022 | Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
| 6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
| 6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |