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Single Idea 17992
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
]
Full Idea
It seems to me that the most important and interesting thing which philosophers have tried to do ...is to give a general description of the whole of the Universe.
Gist of Idea
The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
Source
G.E. Moore (Some Main Problems of Philosophy [1911], Ch. 1)
Book Ref
Moore,G.E.: 'Some Main Problems of Philosophy' [George Allen and Unwin 1953], p.1
A Reaction
He adds that they aim to show what is in it, and what might be in it, and how the two relate. This sort of big view is the one I favour. I think the hallmark of philosophical thought is a high level of generality. He next proceeds to defend common sense.
The
23 ideas
from G.E. Moore
21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related
[Moore,GE, by Heil]
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17992
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The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
[Moore,GE]
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7527
|
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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6405
|
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism
[Moore,GE, by Grayling]
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22302
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Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
[Moore,GE, by Potter]
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7526
|
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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8039
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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22151
|
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction
[Boulter on Moore,GE]
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8033
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Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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8032
|
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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11050
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent
[Hanna on Moore,GE]
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23726
|
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism
[Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
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5925
|
The three main values are good, right and beauty
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
|
5902
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For Moore, 'right' is what produces good
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
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5907
|
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them
[Ross on Moore,GE]
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11057
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It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
[Moore,GE]
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11056
|
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
[Moore,GE]
|
5903
|
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
[Moore,GE]
|
18676
|
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
[Moore,GE]
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21233
|
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
[Moore,GE]
|
6349
|
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
[Moore,GE]
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20147
|
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
[Moore,GE]
|
6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
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