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Full Idea
Are there such things as 'partial propositions', which are truth-valueless relative to some possible worlds?
Gist of Idea
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds?
Source
Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 1.1)
Book Ref
Magidor,Ofra: 'Category Mistakes' [OUP 2013], p.6
A Reaction
Presumably this could be expressed without possible worlds. Are there propositions meaningful in New Guinea, and meaningless in England? Do some propositions require the contingent existence of certain objects to be meaningful?
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |