more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Is it a necessary condition on possessing the concepts of 'two' and 'green' that one does not believe that two is green? I think this claim is false.
Gist of Idea
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green?
Source
Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4)
Book Ref
Magidor,Ofra: 'Category Mistakes' [OUP 2013], p.61
A Reaction
To see that it is false one only has to consider much more sophisticated concepts, which are grasped without knowing their full implications. I might think two is green because I fully grasp 'two', but have not yet mastered 'green'.
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
| 18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |