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Full Idea
The intuitions of which mathematicians speak are not those which Platonism requires.
Gist of Idea
Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs
Source
Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 03.3)
Book Ref
Kitcher,Philip: 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' [OUP 1984], p.61
A Reaction
The point is that it is not taken to be a 'special' ability, but rather a general insight arising from knowledge of mathematics. I take that to be a good account of intuition, which I define as 'inarticulate rationality'.
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| 9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
| 17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 9831 | Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege] |
| 12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
| 12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
| 18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
| 10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
| 8756 | Intuition doesn't support much mathematics, and we should question its reliability [Maddy, by Shapiro] |