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Single Idea 18136

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism ]

Full Idea

If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results

Gist of Idea

If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied

Source

David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3)

Book Ref

Bostock,David: 'Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction' [Wiley-Blackwell 2009], p.252

A Reaction

I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important.

Related Ideas

Idea 18139 The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]

Idea 18151 Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]

The 19 ideas with the same theme [maths entities only allowed if freshly defined]:

18203 Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré]
8746 To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro]
21568 A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
18126 A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
18128 Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
18124 Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
21559 We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell]
21558 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell]
8747 Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro]
10045 Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
18131 If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock]
18134 Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock]
18135 If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock]
18136 If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock]
18132 The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock]
18133 The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock]
13663 Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro]
8730 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro]
15370 Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten]