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Single Idea 18170
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
]
Full Idea
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if it is true, the ramification it is meant to cope with was pointless to begin with.
Gist of Idea
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed
Source
Willard Quine (Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types [1967], p.152), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1
Book Ref
Maddy,Penelope: 'Naturalism in Mathematics' [OUP 2000], p.12
A Reaction
Maddy says the rejection of Reducibility collapsed the ramified theory of types into the simple theory.
The
326 ideas
from Willard Quine
19046
|
Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism
[Quine]
|
19047
|
Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful
[Quine]
|
19048
|
Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences
[Quine]
|
19049
|
In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning
[Quine]
|
19050
|
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences
[Quine]
|
13010
|
In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic
[Boghossian on Quine]
|
13829
|
If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter
[Hacking on Quine]
|
9001
|
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'
[Quine]
|
9002
|
Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables
[Quine]
|
9003
|
Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling
[Quine]
|
9004
|
If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic
[Quine]
|
13681
|
Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions
[Quine, by Sider]
|
9005
|
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
[Quine]
|
9006
|
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
[Quine]
|
22153
|
Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct
[Quine, by Boulter]
|
19485
|
Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything
[Quine]
|
19486
|
We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers
[Quine]
|
19487
|
Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses
[Quine]
|
7627
|
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology
[Maund on Quine]
|
8871
|
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired
[Quine, by Davidson]
|
8826
|
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge
[Kim on Quine]
|
8827
|
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs
[Kim on Quine]
|
1635
|
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper
[Quine]
|
8898
|
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence
[Quine]
|
8899
|
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence
[Quine]
|
8900
|
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity
[Quine]
|
10370
|
Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions
[Quine, by Schaffer,J]
|
4216
|
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth
[Quine, by Lowe]
|
14490
|
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it
[Thomasson on Quine]
|
5745
|
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism
[Melia on Quine]
|
8789
|
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic
[Hale/Wright on Quine]
|
16966
|
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that
[Quine]
|
18966
|
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified
[Quine]
|
16961
|
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables
[Quine]
|
16963
|
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants
[Quine]
|
16964
|
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true
[Quine]
|
16965
|
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express
[Quine]
|
18438
|
Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states
[Quine]
|
9763
|
For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary
[Quine]
|
9764
|
Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy
[Quine]
|
11092
|
A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process
[Quine]
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
[Quine]
|
11094
|
'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop
[Quine]
|
11095
|
We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse
[Quine]
|
11093
|
We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape
[Quine]
|
11096
|
Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree
[Quine]
|
11097
|
Red is the largest red thing in the universe
[Quine]
|
11101
|
General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do
[Quine]
|
11099
|
Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object
[Quine]
|
11104
|
Concepts are language
[Quine]
|
11102
|
Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms
[Quine]
|
11103
|
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it
[Quine]
|
19045
|
Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability
[Quine]
|
18439
|
Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly
[Quine]
|
18440
|
Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive
[Quine]
|
18441
|
No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation)
[Quine]
|
18442
|
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it
[Quine]
|
13589
|
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
[Quine]
|
13588
|
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits
[Quine]
|
13590
|
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates
[Quine]
|
8483
|
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry
[Quine]
|
13591
|
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn
[Quine]
|
13592
|
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines
[Quine]
|
18170
|
The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed
[Quine]
|
21338
|
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage
[Quine]
|
19321
|
We might do without names, by converting them into predicates
[Quine, by Kirkham]
|
12221
|
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate'
[Quine]
|
21685
|
Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science
[Quine]
|
21686
|
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables
[Quine]
|
12219
|
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
10921
|
Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences
[Quine]
|
10922
|
Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into
[Quine]
|
10924
|
Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves
[Quine]
|
10923
|
Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties
[Quine]
|
13713
|
Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones
[Quine, by Sider]
|
22430
|
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth
[Quine]
|
22432
|
Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value
[Quine]
|
22431
|
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements
[Quine]
|
22433
|
It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless
[Quine]
|
22435
|
The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then
[Quine]
|
22436
|
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language
[Quine]
|
22438
|
Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with
[Quine]
|
22437
|
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept
[Quine]
|
22434
|
Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it
[Quine]
|
8205
|
Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time
[Quine]
|
8207
|
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases
[Quine]
|
8206
|
Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia
[Quine]
|
8208
|
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise
[Quine]
|
7375
|
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences
[Quine, by Dennett]
|
16932
|
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer
[Quine]
|
16933
|
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science
[Quine]
|
16934
|
General terms depend on similarities among things
[Quine]
|
16935
|
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another
[Quine]
|
16936
|
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red'
[Quine]
|
16937
|
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle
[Quine]
|
16938
|
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour?
[Quine]
|
8486
|
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped
[Quine]
|
16939
|
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation
[Quine]
|
16941
|
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause
[Quine]
|
16940
|
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations
[Quine]
|
16943
|
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point
[Quine]
|
16942
|
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained
[Quine]
|
16944
|
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method
[Quine]
|
16945
|
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve
[Quine]
|
16947
|
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine
[Quine]
|
16948
|
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity'
[Quine]
|
16949
|
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations
[Quine]
|
21748
|
More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method
[Quine]
|
21749
|
Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices
[Quine]
|
21750
|
Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation
[Quine]
|
21751
|
Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself
[Quine]
|
4577
|
There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity
[Quine]
|
9879
|
NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions
[Quine, by Dummett]
|
21696
|
Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes)
[Quine]
|
21697
|
The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand
[Quine]
|
21698
|
All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic
[Quine]
|
8455
|
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8456
|
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
12210
|
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical
[Fine,K on Quine]
|
10241
|
For Quine, there is only one way to exist
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
8459
|
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
4064
|
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin
[Quine, by Crane]
|
19277
|
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away
[Quine, by Hale]
|
4443
|
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment
[Quine, by Armstrong]
|
16261
|
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication
[Maudlin on Quine]
|
1619
|
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations
[Dennett on Quine]
|
19159
|
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them
[Quine, by Davidson]
|
8856
|
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
7698
|
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available
[Jacquette on Quine]
|
15402
|
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
|
1617
|
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
[Quine]
|
1609
|
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
[Quine]
|
1611
|
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
[Quine]
|
1610
|
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
[Quine]
|
1615
|
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
[Quine]
|
1613
|
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
[Quine]
|
1614
|
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
[Quine]
|
1612
|
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
[Quine]
|
1616
|
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
[Quine]
|
1618
|
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
[Quine]
|
8497
|
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
[Quine]
|
8496
|
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
[Quine]
|
8498
|
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
[Quine]
|
18209
|
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
[Quine]
|
12443
|
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
[Quine]
|
8470
|
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
18963
|
Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms
[Quine]
|
1633
|
Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions
[Quine]
|
18964
|
Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual
[Quine]
|
18965
|
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
[Quine]
|
21642
|
If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology
[Quine]
|
1634
|
Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory
[Quine]
|
10014
|
Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects
[Quine, by Hodes]
|
9012
|
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences
[Quine]
|
9011
|
Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence
[Quine]
|
9007
|
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition
[Quine]
|
9008
|
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences
[Quine]
|
9010
|
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence
[Quine]
|
9009
|
Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth
[Quine]
|
9019
|
Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times
[Quine]
|
9014
|
Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q)
[Quine]
|
9017
|
Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication
[Quine]
|
9018
|
A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time
[Quine]
|
9013
|
We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)'
[Quine]
|
9016
|
Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication
[Quine]
|
9015
|
Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification
[Quine]
|
9020
|
My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification
[Quine]
|
9021
|
A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true
[Quine]
|
10828
|
Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities
[Quine]
|
10012
|
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity
[Quine]
|
10705
|
Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity
[Quine]
|
9025
|
You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named
[Quine]
|
9026
|
Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects
[Quine]
|
9024
|
Excluded middle has three different definitions
[Quine]
|
9023
|
If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject
[Quine]
|
9028
|
Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages
[Quine]
|
9027
|
A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true
[Quine]
|
18967
|
A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence
[Quine]
|
18968
|
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition?
[Quine]
|
18969
|
How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs?
[Quine]
|
18970
|
The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position
[Quine]
|
9471
|
Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised
[Quine]
|
9203
|
We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
9201
|
Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described
[Quine, by Fine,K]
|
10925
|
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential
[Quine]
|
10926
|
Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense
[Quine]
|
14645
|
To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to
[Quine]
|
10927
|
Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified
[Quine]
|
10930
|
Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence
[Quine]
|
10928
|
Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely
[Quine]
|
10931
|
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally
[Quine]
|
15788
|
Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject
[Quine, by Lycan]
|
9379
|
A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it
[Quine]
|
10801
|
Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions
[Quine]
|
18198
|
Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted
[Quine]
|
14296
|
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term
[Quine]
|
21700
|
Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible
[Quine]
|
21699
|
Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects
[Quine]
|
21701
|
Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it
[Quine]
|
8461
|
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes
[Quine]
|
8462
|
A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental
[Quine]
|
8463
|
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory
[Quine]
|
21717
|
Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions
[Quine, by Linsky,B]
|
21687
|
It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience
[Quine]
|
21688
|
There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories
[Quine]
|
5747
|
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions
[Quine, by Melia]
|
13387
|
Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects
[Quine]
|
7925
|
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
[Quine]
|
8277
|
I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity'
[Lowe on Quine]
|
1630
|
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract)
[Quine]
|
1631
|
You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs
[Quine]
|
1632
|
Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages
[Quine]
|
6564
|
To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not'
[Quine]
|
10242
|
I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately
[Quine]
|
10243
|
My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc.
[Quine]
|
20296
|
Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases
[Quine, by Rey]
|
8998
|
Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false
[Quine]
|
8999
|
Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions
[Quine]
|
9000
|
If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role?
[Quine]
|
10064
|
Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism
[Quine, by Musgrave]
|
8993
|
If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic
[Quine]
|
8994
|
If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry
[Quine]
|
8995
|
Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute
[Quine]
|
8996
|
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money...
[Quine]
|
8997
|
There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry
[Quine]
|
17738
|
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics
[Jenkins on Quine]
|
9204
|
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions
[Fine,K on Quine]
|
15090
|
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths
[Quine, by Shoemaker]
|
12188
|
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity
[Quine, by McFetridge]
|
19492
|
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology
[Yablo on Quine]
|
19488
|
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations
[Quine, by Yablo]
|
9383
|
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori
[Boghossian on Quine]
|
12424
|
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori
[Quine, by Kitcher]
|
9338
|
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science
[Horwich on Quine]
|
9337
|
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori
[Quine, by Horwich]
|
9340
|
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right
[Horwich on Quine]
|
7317
|
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous
[Quine, by Miller,A]
|
9366
|
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori
[Quine, by Boghossian]
|
14473
|
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution
[Quine, by Thomasson]
|
7321
|
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best
[Miller,A on Quine]
|
8803
|
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language
[Davidson on Quine]
|
17737
|
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation
[Quine, by Jenkins]
|
9371
|
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
[Quine]
|
10929
|
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
[Quine]
|
1620
|
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
[Quine]
|
1621
|
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
[Quine]
|
1622
|
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
[Quine]
|
1623
|
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
[Quine]
|
1624
|
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
[Quine]
|
1625
|
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
[Quine]
|
1626
|
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
[Quine]
|
1627
|
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
[Quine]
|
1628
|
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
[Quine]
|
1629
|
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
[Quine]
|
8202
|
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words
[Quine]
|
8201
|
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction
[Quine]
|
8203
|
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets
[Quine]
|
21689
|
A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself?
[Quine]
|
21690
|
Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on
[Quine]
|
21691
|
Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions
[Quine]
|
21692
|
If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox
[Quine]
|
21693
|
Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set
[Quine]
|
21694
|
Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical
[Quine]
|
21695
|
The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one
[Quine]
|
19042
|
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined
[Quine]
|
19043
|
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object
[Quine]
|
13639
|
Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
21557
|
Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language
[Quine, by Lackey]
|
6891
|
Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory
[Quine, by Mautner]
|
3131
|
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism
[Quine, by Rey]
|
4630
|
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another
[Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
|
3988
|
Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states
[Dennett on Quine]
|
6310
|
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available
[Quine]
|
6311
|
The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge
[Quine]
|
6312
|
We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai'
[Quine]
|
6313
|
Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive
[Quine]
|
6314
|
Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them
[Quine]
|
6317
|
Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation
[Quine]
|
6315
|
We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs
[Quine]
|
12798
|
Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether
[Quine]
|
16462
|
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation
[Quine]
|
8464
|
Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected
[Quine]
|
8482
|
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist?
[Quine]
|
12136
|
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged
[Brody on Quine]
|
8504
|
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes
[Quine, by Devitt]
|
15490
|
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them
[Quine, by Martin,CB]
|
15723
|
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal'
[Quine]
|
15724
|
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science
[Quine]
|
15725
|
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false.
[Quine]
|
15722
|
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known
[Quine]
|
15719
|
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is
[Quine]
|
15721
|
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures
[Quine]
|
15720
|
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context
[Quine]
|
17594
|
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy'
[Quine]
|
7924
|
The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science
[Quine]
|
17905
|
Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity
[Quine]
|
9556
|
Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects
[Quine]
|
10793
|
Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal
[Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10311
|
No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts
[Quine, by Hale]
|
10538
|
Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction
[Quine, by Dummett]
|
8466
|
For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8467
|
Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
10667
|
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible
[Quine, by Hossack]
|
3325
|
For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
16021
|
Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology)
[Quine, by Noonan]
|
13736
|
Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure
[Schaffer,J on Quine]
|
10211
|
Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
3302
|
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
3336
|
Two things can never entail three things
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
8453
|
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
[Quine]
|
3751
|
Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true
[Quine, by Jacquette]
|
4712
|
Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable'
[Quine, by O'Grady]
|
15783
|
Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist
[Lycan on Quine]
|
8479
|
Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things'
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
10295
|
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets
[Quine, by Shapiro]
|
3322
|
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic
[Quine, by Benardete,JA]
|
6078
|
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties
[Quine, by McGinn]
|
8534
|
Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications
[Quine, by Armstrong]
|
4713
|
For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations
[Quine, by O'Grady]
|
15782
|
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia
[Quine, by Lycan]
|
2796
|
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically
[Quine, by Dancy,J]
|
8450
|
Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
3868
|
To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it
[Quine, by Newton-Smith]
|
7330
|
The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants
[Quine, by Miller,A]
|
17862
|
Essence gives an illusion of understanding
[Quine, by Almog]
|
7970
|
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist
[Quine, by Macdonald,C]
|