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Single Idea 18205

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems ]

Full Idea

The case of atoms makes it clear that the indispensable appearance of an entity in our best scientific theory is not generally enough to convince scientists that it is real.

Gist of Idea

The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real

Source

Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6)

Book Ref

Maddy,Penelope: 'Naturalism in Mathematics' [OUP 2000], p.143


A Reaction

She refers to the period between Dalton and Einstein, when theories were full of atoms, but there was strong reluctance to actually say that they existed, until the direct evidence was incontrovertable. Nice point.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [troubles with theories of commitment]:

To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]