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Single Idea 18335

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers ]

Full Idea

It is claimed that truth-makers explain universals, or ontological commitment, or commitment to realism, or to the correspondence theory of truth, or to falsify behaviourism or phenomenalism.

Gist of Idea

There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 04)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.5

A Reaction

[compressed] This expands the view that truth-making is based on its explanatory power, rather than on its intuitive correctness. I take the theory to presuppose realism. I don't believe in universals. It marginalises correspondence. Commitment is good!

Related Idea

Idea 18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]

The 21 ideas from Adolph Rami

10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]