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Single Idea 18338

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence ]

Full Idea

Most truth-maker theorists are internalists about the truth-maker relation. ...But the correspondence theory makes truth an external relation to some portion of reality. So a truth-maker internalist should not claim to be a narrow correspondence theorist.

Gist of Idea

Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.8

A Reaction

[wording rearranged] Like many of Rami's distinctions in this article, this feels simplistic. Sharp distinctions can only be made using sharp vocabulary, and there isn't much of that around in philosophy!

The 15 ideas from 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]