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Single Idea 18339
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
]
Full Idea
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-many. In the latter case, different truths may have the same truth-maker, and one truth may have different truth-makers.
Gist of Idea
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.9
A Reaction
'There is at least one cat' obviously has many possible truth-makers. Many statements will be made true by the mere existence of a particular cat (such as 'there is an animal in the room' and 'there is a cat in the room'). Many-many wins?
The
15 ideas
from 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'
18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
[Rami]
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18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
[Rami]
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
[Rami]
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18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
[Rami]
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18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
[Rami]
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18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
[Rami]
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18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
[Rami]
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18336
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Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
[Rami]
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18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
[Rami]
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18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
[Rami]
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18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
[Rami]
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18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
[Rami]
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
[Rami]
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
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18350
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Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
[Rami]
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