more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 18340
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
]
Full Idea
Truthmaker anti-monism holds the view that there are truth-makers of different kinds. For example, objects, facts, tropes or events can all be regarded as truthmakers. Objects seem right for existential truths but not others, so anti-monism seems best.
Gist of Idea
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.9
A Reaction
Presumably we need to identify the different types of truth (analytic, synthetic, general, particular...), and only then ask what truth-makers there are for the different types. To presuppose one type of truthmaker would be crazy.
The
15 ideas
from 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'
18333
|
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
[Rami]
|
18335
|
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
[Rami]
|
18334
|
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
[Rami]
|
18339
|
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
[Rami]
|
18340
|
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
[Rami]
|
18338
|
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
[Rami]
|
18337
|
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
[Rami]
|
18336
|
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
[Rami]
|
18341
|
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
[Rami]
|
18342
|
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
[Rami]
|
18343
|
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
[Rami]
|
18346
|
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
[Rami]
|
18345
|
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
[Rami]
|
18347
|
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
|
18350
|
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
[Rami]
|