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Single Idea 18340

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

Truthmaker anti-monism holds the view that there are truth-makers of different kinds. For example, objects, facts, tropes or events can all be regarded as truthmakers. Objects seem right for existential truths but not others, so anti-monism seems best.

Gist of Idea

It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.9

A Reaction

Presumably we need to identify the different types of truth (analytic, synthetic, general, particular...), and only then ask what truth-makers there are for the different types. To presuppose one type of truthmaker would be crazy.

The 21 ideas from Adolph Rami

10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]