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Single Idea 18340

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths ]

Full Idea

Truthmaker anti-monism holds the view that there are truth-makers of different kinds. For example, objects, facts, tropes or events can all be regarded as truthmakers. Objects seem right for existential truths but not others, so anti-monism seems best.

Gist of Idea

It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events

Source

Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 05)

Book Ref

'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.9

A Reaction

Presumably we need to identify the different types of truth (analytic, synthetic, general, particular...), and only then ask what truth-makers there are for the different types. To presuppose one type of truthmaker would be crazy.

The 15 ideas from 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]