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Full Idea
As truth-makers, some theorists only accept states of affairs, some only accept individuals and states of affairs, and some only accept individuals and particular properties.
Gist of Idea
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 06)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.10
A Reaction
It seems to me rash to opt for one of these. Truths come in wide-ranging and subtly different types, and the truth-makers probably have a similar range. Any one of these theories will almost certainly quickly succumb to a counterexample.
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |