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Single Idea 18341
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
]
Full Idea
As truth-makers, some theorists only accept states of affairs, some only accept individuals and states of affairs, and some only accept individuals and particular properties.
Gist of Idea
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 06)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.10
A Reaction
It seems to me rash to opt for one of these. Truths come in wide-ranging and subtly different types, and the truth-makers probably have a similar range. Any one of these theories will almost certainly quickly succumb to a counterexample.
The
21 ideas
from Adolph Rami
10938
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The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
[Rami]
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10934
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Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties
[Rami]
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10933
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Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
[Rami]
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10932
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If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'
[Rami]
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10939
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'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
[Rami]
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10940
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An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object
[Rami]
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18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
[Rami]
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18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
[Rami]
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
[Rami]
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18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
[Rami]
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18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
[Rami]
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18336
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Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
[Rami]
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18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
[Rami]
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18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
[Rami]
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18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
[Rami]
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18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
[Rami]
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18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
[Rami]
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18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
[Rami]
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
[Rami]
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
[Rami]
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18350
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Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
[Rami]
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