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Full Idea
The 'entailment principle' for truth-makers says that if x is a truth-maker for y, and y entails z, then x is a truth-maker for z.
Gist of Idea
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 08)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.25
A Reaction
I think the correct locution is that 'x is a potential truth-maker for z' (should anyone every formulate z, which in most cases they never will, since the entailments of y are probably infinite). Merricks would ask 'but are y and z about the same thing?'.
Related Idea
Idea 14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |