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Full Idea
The thesis that 'truth supervenes on being' (with or without possible worlds) offers only a necessary condition for the truth of contingent propositions, whereas the standard truth-maker theory offers necessary and sufficient conditions.
Gist of Idea
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 09)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.29
A Reaction
The point, I suppose, is that the change in being might be irrelevant to the proposition in question, so any old change in being will not ensure a change in the truth of the proposition. Again we ask - but what is this truth about?
Related Idea
Idea 14408 Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |