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Full Idea
According to the moderate deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property.
Clarification
'disjunction' involves the concept of 'or'
Gist of Idea
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
Source
Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 10)
Book Ref
'Truth and Truth-Making', ed/tr. Lowe,E.J./Rami,A. [Acumen 2009], p.32
A Reaction
[He cites Horwich 1998] That is, I presume, that truth is embodied in an infinity of propositions of the form '"p" is true iff p'.
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |